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Executive Summary
Too often political discussion of oil-wealthy states like Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) becomes centred on the means in which their economic largesse facilitates 
political quiescence. While rulers of these states, which I dub ‘super-rentiers’ due to their 
massive oil and gas wealth, have at times used their riches as a means of buying good 
will from their citizenries, they cannot and have not completely deterred independent 
political actors. Of these, ideological agents are, logically, the least likely to be ‘bought 
off’ and therefore the most viable independent political forces. Nonetheless, political 
Islam is rarely discussed in the context of the Gulf states which provide few institu-
tionalised opportunities for political participation and do not require welfare services 
often provided by Islamist groups. In this paper, I discuss the degree to which Muslim 
Brotherhood affiliates in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE influence political decision-mak-
ing and how those governments have chosen to handle the Ikhwan.1 Given my analysis, 
I provide the following policy recommendations to both regional and Western actors.
1 The terms ‘Ikhwan’ (the Arabic term for Brotherhood) and ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ are used here 
interchangeably. 
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Policy Recommendations
Policy Recommendations for Gulf Governments
• Look beyond economic considerations. A variety of political outcomes is observed 
in states with similar GDPs, thereby eliminating economic wellbeing as an explan-
atory factor for political outcomes. Considering citizens’ political demands as pri-
marily pecuniary is short sighted and simplistic. Not only is paying off unhappy 
citizens unsustainable, it also fails to address the root of most viable political com-
plaint in the Gulf, which is Islamist-driven.
• Do not underestimate the power of informal Islamist networks. Simply because an 
Islamist strand is not institutionalised does not mean it is politically unimportant; 
the super-rentiers are under-institutionalised, rather than under-politicised.
• Recognise the political importance of social policies. The social and the political 
spheres become less distinct in states which allow limited space for independent 
political action. Part of the Brotherhood’s appeal remains its ability to provide so-
cial networks, as well as a broader ideology that informs political action.
• Consider co-optation, rather than crackdown, a more sustainable policy towards 
Brotherhood affiliates in the Gulf. These groups will not disappear, but rather will 
go further underground. Because it appeals to local populations, Ikhwan ideology 
will remain in the region, despite government crackdowns. Rather than working 
against Brotherhood groups and attempting to dismantle them, regimes should 
endeavour to co-opt them.
Policy Recommendations for Western Governments
• Pay close attention to the politics of cultural and national identity in the Gulf Co-
operation Council (GCC). Because socio-economic issues are less important for Is-
lamists in such states, these matters take on primary significance. As the number of 
Western expatriates increases in these states, Islamists will probably continue to po-
sition themselves as preservers of local identity and culture, as well as Islamic values.
• Do not simplify the role of Brotherhood organisations as solely political, as their so-
cial role is influential. Such a social presence is particularly important in states which 
provide limited means of institutionalised political participation, as in the Gulf.
• Discourage the use of monetary disbursements as a means of addressing Islamist 
complaint. Because such movements do not provide material support or seek to 
gain it, they cannot be ‘bought off’ and indeed have not been in the past, even in 
states where they needed fiscal assistance.
• Do not treat all Muslim Brotherhood affiliates as part of the same group. Even in 
the small states of the Gulf, which have striking economic and political similarities, 
the Brotherhood functions differently. It is not possible, then, to have a blanket 
policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood; its international cohesion is limited in the 
present day.
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Introduction
Muslim Brotherhood movements in the wealthiest rentier states of Kuwait, Qatar, and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are often overlooked as domestic political actors, due 
to the relatively placid environments of such states and comparatively few means of 
institutionalised political participation (outside of Kuwait). In reality, grassroots social 
outreach programmes in the Gulf help Brotherhood members spread their ideology 
and garner support. Although they are not needed on the material level in the Gulf 
(aside from Iraqi-occupied Kuwait), such programmes have become popular in their 
provision of ideological guidance and social activities in societies that are often criticised 
for lacking indigenous intellectual or cultural vibrancy. They also link the Brotherhood 
to political life; ‘by engaging in hands-on activist work in popular neighbourhoods, 
they [Islamists] have learned the informal language of politics spoken by the people’.2 
Brotherhood affiliates in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE thus exercise political influence 
primarily due to their ideological appeal. In Kuwait, the Brotherhood influences politi-
cal outcomes in a straightforward way through its participation in electoral politics and 
its grassroots outreach, particularly in the youth and education sector, which helps to 
influence new generations of voters. In Qatar, the Brotherhood maintains social influ-
ence, which is communicated to the political leadership largely through the informal 
sector of the majlis.3 The Emirati Brotherhood, though outlawed today, operated in 
the social sphere primarily, yet also came to join forces with other political opposition 
movements in the efforts to expand popular participation in government. 
Persistence of Brotherhood Ideology in the Super-Rentiers
Kuwait
The Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, established in 1951, is the most organised and 
influential branch in the Gulf. In its first decades, through Jamʿiat al-Irshad (1951-59) 
and Jamʿiat al-Islah al-Ijtimaʿi (hereafter Islah, 1963 to present), it enjoyed cordial 
ties with the regime, and, beginning in the 1960s, had some limited political success, 
especially with social policies like the banning of alcohol (1965) and the restriction of 
nationality to Muslims (1982). Through to the 1980s, Brotherhood members were par-
ticularly powerful in the ministries of education and Islamic Affairs, and this influence 
lasted for generations through the curricula they approved.
From 1981, the Kuwaiti Brotherhood contested parliamentary elections as an organisa-
tion, and a decade later it created a dedicated political bloc, the Islamic Constitutional 
Movement (ICM or Hadas), alongside Islah, its social arm. The Ikhwan in Kuwait is 
2  Salwa Ismail, Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 
p. 176.
3 The majlis (plural majalis), similar to Kuwait’s diwaniyya, is a crucial element of civil society. Such 
meetings are hosted by rulers, as well as by private citizens.
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distinct in the Gulf not only because it contests legislative elections, but also because 
it is the only branch that has been forced to provide services in the state’s absence – a 
task common among Brotherhood affiliates outside of the Gulf. The Kuwaiti branch 
undertook this during the Iraqi occupation from August 1990 to March 1991. 
Today, the ICM forms a critical part of the broader Kuwaiti opposition movement that 
includes secular, left-leaning political groupings. Its agenda remains exclusively domes-
tic. Former ICM MP Nasser al-Sane explains, ‘of course we want Islam to be our social 
norm and the government to respect Islam’.4 Nonetheless, the bloc’s primary goals 
have changed from a focus on enshrining shariʿa as the source of legislation in Kuwait 
to promoting a pro-democracy agenda. The organisation pushes for reforms such as an 
elected prime minister, a single electoral district to reduce gerrymandering, the legal-
isation of political parties, and, eventually, the creation of a constitutional monarchy. 
Reflecting their commitment to domestic politics, ‘the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood 
are Kuwaiti first and Muslim Brotherhood second’.5 Indeed, it formally broke ties with 
its mother organisation following the failure of the latter to support the US-led liber-
ation of Kuwait in 1991. While its members remain outspoken in their disapproval of 
the Egyptian Sisi regime, with the organisation condemning his takeover as a coup 
three days after it took place,6 the issue has not remained central to its platform7 – 
despite the government investing US$4 billion in Sisi’s regime.
The organisation’s agenda is marked by gradualism. Until recently it has sought to make 
incremental changes through the existing system and with the ruling family. Despite 
its boycott of elections since 2012, former ICM MP Usama al-Shahin insisted, ‘we are 
100 percent loyal to [the ruling family]. 
We want reform, repair, not change’.8 
In fact, the amir meets with members of 
the Brotherhood and attends their diwan-
iyyat,9 demonstrating that the Kuwaiti 
government, unlike others in the Gulf, 
‘isn’t in panic mode’.10 
4  Interview with Nasser al-Sane, 21 November 2013. 
5  Interview with Mohammad al-Rumaihi, 25 November 2013.
6  Lori Plotkin Boghardt, ‘Kuwait’s Elections: It’s Not What Happens Now, but What Happens Next’, 
The Washington Institute Policy Analysis, 26 July 2013. Available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/view/kuwaits-elections-its-not-what-happens-now-but-what-happens-next 
7  Heba Saleh, ‘Gulf states put their money on Sisi’s Egypt with pledges worth $12bn’, Financial Times, 
13 March 2015. Available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/85c2b3cc-c9a0-11e4-a2d9-00144feab7de.
html#axzz3nP85255k.
8  Interview with Usama al-Shahin, 24 November 2013.
9 A diwaniyya (plural diwaniyyat) is an informal meeting, which has long been a part of Kuwaiti political 
life. Such gatherings, hosted by members of the ruling family, politicians, and private individuals, are 
most often convened in homes and cover topics ranging from social life to religious ideology to politics.
10  Interview with Abdullah al-Shayeji, 27 November 2013.
‘The Kuwaiti Muslim  
Brotherhood are Kuwaiti first 
and Muslim Brotherhood second’ 
- Mohammad al-Rumaihi
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Like the other political blocks that compete for seats in the Kuwaiti parliament, the Broth-
erhood does not enjoy legal recognition in Kuwait. But only limited actions have targeted 
the Brotherhood specifically: a lawsuit calling for the closure of Islah in March 2014, 
an MP trying to outlaw the Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation in July 2014, and 
rumours circulating about purges of Brotherhood supporters from government in 2013. 
The lack of large-scale government action against the Ikhwan is in part due to the larger 
role that it plays in the opposition movement. Because ‘Kuwaiti Islamists are liberal 
politically but conservative socially’,11 they are able to work with secular liberal members 
of the opposition. Indeed, the Brotherhood has never run for a plurality of seats in par-
liament, instead allying with other blocs to enhance its influence in the legislature while 
also gaining political cover from secular groups. Determining the ICM’s popularity, 
then, is difficult, especially since it generally does not give estimates of its member-
ship numbers. As of 1989, 
however, the number of 
officially registered mem-
bers of the movement 
reached 1,170.12
Qatar
Qatar, like the UAE, no longer houses an organised Muslim Brotherhood affiliate. 
Although the Qatari Brotherhood completed its voluntary disbandment by 2003, 
claims remain about its ongoing political influence. One Qatari explained, ‘Muslim 
Brotherhood influence is informal, not institutionalised’,13 making it difficult to trace. 
In an institutionalised form, the Qatari Brotherhood was founded in 1974, after an 
influx of Qatari students returned to the country, having studied in places like Egypt 
and Kuwait with active Ikhwan movements. Eager to replicate such movements at 
home, these students created the organisation described by former Supreme Leader 
Jassim Sultan as ‘just collaboration, a simple thing’.14 Before this, Brotherhood ideology 
had become popular through the prominent positions of sympathetic expatriates in the 
education system. For a brief period in the 1980s, under the influence of newly emi-
grated members of the Syrian Brotherhood, the Qatari Ikhwan published a magazine, 
al-umma al-Qatariyya (The Qatari Umma), under the leadership of Amr Abid Husna.15 
11  Interview with Abdulla al-Nibari, 2 February 2014.
12  Falah Abdullah al-Mdaires, Jamaʿat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi al-Kuwait (The Muslim Brotherhood 
Group in Kuwait), (Kuwait: Huquq al-Taba’ va-l-Nashar Mahfuza, 1994), p. 22.
13  Interview with Hassan al-Ibrahim, 2 October 2013.
14  Interview with Jassim Sultan, 4 November 2013.
15  Mustafa Ashur, ‘Tajribat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi Qatar’ (The Experience of the Muslim Broth-
erhood in Qatar), in Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa-l-Salafiyyun fi al-Khalij (The Muslim Brotherhood and 
Salafis in the Gulf), ed. by Al-Mesbar Studies and Research Centre, pp. 187-204. (Dubai: Al-Mesbar 
Studies and Research Centre, 2011), p.192.
‘Kuwaiti Islamists are liberal politically  
but conservative socially.’ - Abdulla al-Nibari
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By the end of the 1980s, a generational split emerged. Younger members hoped to 
ramp up political activities and older ones were cautious.16 Division led to the creation 
of an extensive two-part study – ‘an intellectual and organisational dissection of the 
Brotherhood’ in terms of its structure, communication, leadership, prevailing culture, 
and goals, as well as feasibility of the goals and risks associated with them.17 Import-
ant questions included: Is there a real plan for the organisation? How much has been 
achieved, and what remains to be accomplished?18 The study ‘finished with one of the 
problems that pushed the re-evaluation to begin: that the Muslim Brotherhood’s plans 
generally lacked clarity – what did it want exactly? And how would it get there?’19 
Members considered the Qatari Brotherhood to have ‘been frozen by dogma, lost 
direction, and failed to adapt’.20 They questioned the need for a Brotherhood organ-
isation in Qatar, a state with few major 
economic, social, or political problems 
or openings, whose oil wealth obviated 
the need for non-state social welfare, and 
which was naturally conservative and reli-
gious due to its Wahhabi roots.21 As the 
Qatari Ikhwan’s former Supreme Guide 
Jassim Sultan put it, ‘[b]y study and 
research, the pitfalls were obvious. The program doesn’t fit Qatar. There is a major 
defect in the theory’.22 
In sum, today, ‘there is interest ideologically, but the Brotherhood’s social struc-
ture is not as helpful in Qatar. It is perhaps least helpful here than in any other Gulf 
state’.23 As a result, the Brotherhood exists in Qatar solely at the ideological level and 
organisationally only on a very limited scale – with small Qurʾanic recitation circles. 
Determining what it means to be a Brotherhood member or supporter in a state lack-
ing formal organisation is challenging. Few Qataris identify themselves as members of 
the Brotherhood even if they agree with its ideology, making it difficult to determine 
the organisation’s domestic popularity and strength. A difference in labelling comes 
into play; ‘[i]t is very complicated because lots of Qataris agree with the Muslim Broth-
erhood but don’t even realise it’.24 
16  Abdulaziz Al-Mahmoud, ‘Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Qatar…Man hum?’ (The Muslim Brotherhood 
in Qatar…Who are They?), Al-Arab, 1 August 2012. Available at http://www.alarab.qa/story/-ناوخلإا
مه-نم-رطق-يف-نوملسملا.
17  Ashur, p.197.
18  Abdullah Al-Nafisi, ‘Al-Hala al-Islamiyya fi Qatar’ (The Islamic Situation in Qatar), IslamToday, 12 
March 2007. Available at http://www.islamtoday.net/bohooth/artshow-19-8828.htm.
19  Amr al-Turabi and Tarek al-Mubarak, ‘Qatar’s Introspective Islamists’, Asharq al-Awsat, 18 June 
2013. Available at http://www.aawsat.net/2013/06/article55306189.
20  Marc Lynch, ‘Muslim Brotherhood Debates’, Abu Aardvark (blog), 28 February 2007. Available at 
http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2007/02/muslim_brotherh.html.
21  Ibid.
22  Interview with Jassim Sultan, 9 October 2013.
23  Interview with Shadi Hamid, 5 November 2013.
24  Interview with Michael Stephens, 1 November 2013.
‘[In Qatar] Muslim Brotherhood 
influence is informal, not  
institutionalised’.  
- Hassan al-Ibrahim
Courtney Freer 11 
Conflation between support for the Brotherhood and allegiance to conservative Islam 
further complicates the study of the organisation in isolation in Qatar. ‘Lots of Qataris 
agree with what al-Qaradawi is saying but they see this as being religious, not being 
Muslim Brotherhood’.25 The government, recognising the appeal of conservative Isla-
mist doctrine in a Wahhabi country, has largely endeavoured to appease, rather than 
silence, such elements, having accepted them as a part of Qatar’s ideological landscape.
The United Arab Emirates
The Emirati Muslim Brotherhood differs from other branches due to the state’s unique 
federal character. First founded in Dubai in 1974, that branch received support from 
that emirate’s leader and Vice President Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed al-Maktoum, signal-
ling the government’s willingness to patronise an Islamist group as a bulwark against 
Arab nationalism. Sheikh Rashid contributed to the establishment of branches in Ras 
al Khaimah and Fujairah, and Emirati President and Abu Dhabi ruler Sheikh Zayed 
bin Sultan al-Nahyan provided land for an Abu Dhabi branch at the end of the 1970s, 
yet it ultimately never gained permission to form there. Sharjah also lacked a branch, a 
reflection of the prevalence of Arabism and nationalism – rather than Islamism – there 
at that time, and also of its close ties to Saudi Arabia. In Ajman, ‘the Brotherhood set-
tled for subordination to the Association of Guidance and Social Counselling [Irshad]’.26 
Like Brotherhood affiliates elsewhere in the region, the Emirati Ikhwan was involved 
in social and cultural activities. Examination of the group’s magazine al-Islah demon-
strates that the most commonly discussed topics concerned the development of Islamic 
education,27 censorship of Western materials such as magazines and television pro-
grammes,28 restriction of the sale of alcohol,29 corruption in government spending,30 
and the encroachment of foreign (particularly Western) businesses and culture in 
Emirati society.31 First and foremost, ‘Islah tapped into issues of Emiratis drinking, 
social issues’.32 The organisation also developed a political reform agenda alongside 
25  Ibid.
26 Mansur al-Noqaidan, ‘Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi al-Imarat: Al-Tamaddad wa-l-Inhisar’ (The 
Muslim Brotherhood in the Emirates: Expansion and Decline), in Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi al Khalij 
(The Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf), ed. by Al-Mesbar Studies and Research Centre, (Dubai: 
Al-Mesbar Studies and Research Centre, 2012), p. 61.
27  ‘Readings into Some Curricula of Private Schools in the Emirates’, al-Islah 57 (1982), in Ali Salem 
Humaid (ed), The Roots of Conspiracy Against the UAE 2, (Dubai: Al Mezmaah Studies and Research 
Centre, 2013), pp. 180-188.
28  ‘Our Children and the Lovely Pig’, al-Islah 34/49 (1982), in Humaid, The Roots of Conspiracy Against 
the UAE 1, p. 48.
29  ‘We Are Waiting for Final Ban’, al-Islah 7/50 (1982), in Humaid, The Roots of Conspiracy Against the 
UAE 1, p. 69.
30  ‘Frugality and Extravagance’, al-Islah 50/51 (1982), in Humaid, The Roots of Conspiracy Against the 
UAE 1, pp.98-99.
31  Omar Abdul Rahman, ‘The Devil Kai and the English Language’, al-Islah 26-27/49 (1982), in 
Humaid, The Roots of Conspiracy Against the UAE 1, p.40.
32  Interview with Dubai-based Gulf correspondent, 6 March 2014.
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its social programme, pressing for more representative government and more equal 
distribution of wealth.33 As early as March 1979, Islah’s UAE management council 
wrote a letter to the local rulers ahead of a meeting of the Supreme Council of Rulers, 
supporting the government’s attempts to diminish corruption and to spend oil money 
in a ‘pious’ way.34 In 1982, al-Islah magazine was more explicit about the organisation’s 
potential role as political opposition in the context of government bans on Islamic 
magazines: ‘With Islam we liberate lands of Islam, we stop injustice to Islam. Tyrants 
are afraid of us because of Islam’.35 
Because its members had come to exert considerable influence on Emirati society 
through positions in the educational and judicial sectors, the Emirati Muslim Broth-
erhood provoked government suspicion in the 1990s. At that time, ‘the UAE’s judicial 
and education sector was effectively a state within a state’,36 and student councils as 
well as teachers’ and judges’ professional associations became ‘outposts dedicated to 
advancing their [Brotherhood] interests’.37 Perhaps fearing that the Emirati Brother-
hood could gain a broader following as a political bloc, as in Kuwait, the government 
resolved to squash it before it could influence politics on an institutionalised level. 
In the early 1990s, investigations by Egyptian security services allegedly proved that 
individuals involved in Egyptian Islamic Jihad had received monetary donations from 
Islah’s Committee for Relief and Outside Activities,38 arguing that the Brotherhood is, 
at its core, an international organisation, ‘imported by Egyptians’, with the goal of a 
single Islamic state.39 The government began investigating the influence of Brother-
hood members within the education sector when promising scholarship applications 
were rejected, and found that the Brotherhood members managed the distribution 
of educational awards.40 Hoping to regain control, the government dissolved the 
Brotherhood’s previously elected boards of directors in 1994,41 placing them under 
supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs.42 External activities were also frozen,43 and 
members were banned from holding public office.44 This decision affected the branches 
33  Pekka Hakala, ‘Opposition in the United Arab Emirates’, Directorate-General for External Policies, 
Policy Department, European Parliament, 15 November 2012, 2. Available at http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=78691. 
34  Al-Noqaidan, pp. 65-66.
35  Abdullah Abu al-Hadi, ‘Why Ban Islamic Magazines?’, al-Islah 30/50 (1982), quoted in Humaid, 
The Roots of Conspiracy Against the UAE 2, p. 172.
36  Sultan Sooud al-Qassemi, ‘The Brothers and the Gulf’, Foreign Policy, 14 December 2012. Available 
at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/14/Muslim_Brotherhood_Gulf_UAE_Qassemi.
37  Ibid.
38  ‘Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi al-Imirat…Al-Qisat al-Kamila’ (The Muslim Brotherhood in the Emir-
ates…The Whole Story), Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 1 February 2013. Available at http://classic.aawsat.com/
details.asp?article=715512&issueno=12484&section=4#.VGtRRofBZKp.
39  Interview with Ebtesam al-Ketbi, 24 February 2014.
40  Marta Saldana, ‘Rentierism and Political Culture in the United Arab Emirates: The Case of UAEU 
Students’, PhD diss., (Exeter: University of Exeter, 2014), p. 139.
41  Hakala, ‘Opposition in the United Arab Emirates’, p. 2.
42  Al-Sharq al-Awsat, ‘Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi al-Imirat…Al-Qisat al-Kamila’.
43  Ibid.
44  Hakala, ‘Opposition in the United Arab Emirates’, p. 2.
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of Islah in Dubai and Fujairah, in addition to the more loosely affiliated Guidance 
Group in Ajman. Notably, the Ras al-Khaimah branch of Islah was exempted from 
ministerial control, though it did have to curtail its external activities.45 Until the most 
recent crackdown, it remained independent under the protection of its sympathetic 
ruler Sheikh Saqr al-Qasimi, who ‘rejected the dissolution of al-Islah because he felt it 
played a role in preserving the youth’.46 
The tense relationship between the Emirati government and the Muslim Brother-
hood became more confrontational following the attacks of 11 September 2001. The 
State Security Directorate arrested over 250 individuals accused of terrorism, mainly 
harbouring Islamist sympathies in 2002, yet most had been released by 2004. The 
government attempted to persuade Islah to disband following September 11, but the 
organisation refused.47 Emirati officials requested that Islah follow Qatar’s example 
because, in their view, if it were not a politically subversive group, it would not require 
independent organisational capacity.48 After months of talks, Islah rejected the govern-
ment’s invitation to continue engaging in daʿwa without an organisational structure. 
Large numbers of Islamist supporters were purged from the educational system.
Despite this setback, the remaining branches of Islah (Dubai, Fujairah, and Ras 
al-Khaimah) and the Guidance Society in Ajman continued with their activities of 
hosting discussions, lectures, and Qurʾan recitation competitions, in addition to the 
publication of al-Islah.49 By the mid-2000s, it had become clear that ‘[t]he regime in 
the UAE is not friendly towards Islamists, and prominent Islamists have been arrested, 
barred from teaching at university, and otherwise harassed by the government’.50 In 
such an environment, it became increasingly difficult for members of Islah to pursue 
their social or political aims. In 2012, as the broader political opposition gained 
momentum after the issuing of a petition a year earlier, all branches of the Brother-
hood were effectively closed down within the UAE.
45  Al-Noqaidan, p. 69.
46  Mohammed al-Roken, quoted in Yara Bayoumy, ‘UAE Islamist Group Had No Desire to Topple 
Government: Families’, Reuters, 3 July 2013. Available at http://reut.rs/12jlUg8.
47  Saldana, ‘Rentierism and Political Culture in the United Arab Emirates: The Case of UAEU Stu-
dents’, p. 140.
48  Interview with Jamal Khashoggi, 23 October 2013.
49  Al-Noqaidan, ‘Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi al-Imarat: Al-Tamaddad wa-l-Inhisar’, p. 74.
50  Herb, ‘Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates’, p. 359.
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From Co-optation to Crackdown: Government Policies 
towards the Brotherhood
Kuwait 
In large measure, due to the fact that the Brotherhood has existed inside Kuwait for 
decades and is the most organised political bloc in the country, that government has 
allowed the Ikhwan to operate relatively openly. It seems to have accepted the Broth-
erhood as part of the political landscape and thus has allowed it to continue its work 
within parameters, placing on it largely the same limits faced by secular political blocs 
in Kuwait. 
Facilitating peaceful relations with the government, the Kuwaiti Brotherhood has 
embraced gradualism in achieving its goals, at least as far as the Islamisation of society 
is concerned. It has instead become a more outspoken member of the broader political 
opposition, privileging limited systemic changes over more limited Islamic social policies. 
Furthermore, because the most elected seats it has ever won was six out of fifty in 2006, 
the Brotherhood does not challenge government authority by contesting a plurality 
of seats. It instead prefers to form coalitions with other political blocs that grant it a 
degree of political cover.51 Most recently, the organisation signed on to a document 
drafted alongside members of the secular Civil Democratic Movement and Musallam 
al-Barrak, who agree about the need for ‘a full parliamentary system, with a stronger 
legislature, independent judiciary and revised criminal code’.52
The government has reacted harshly against recently forged opposition unity, yet has 
not targeted the Brotherhood specifically. Instead, it revoked the citizenship of five 
opposition members in July 2014, a step that Joe Stork, Deputy Director for Middle 
East and North Africa at Human Rights Watch, dubbed ‘yet another downward step 
in Kuwait’s assault on the right to free speech’.53 Those stripped of citizenship did 
not include members of the ICM,54 yet the organisation released a statement call-
ing the situation a ‘regretful example of utilizing the state’s capabilities in fighting 
reformists instead of supporting the process of reform’.55 In January 2015, former 
ICM MP Mubarak al-Duwailah was arrested on charges of endangering ties with 
an ally and insulting leaders of an allied state following his statements, on Kuwait’s 
51  Shadi Hamid, Temptations of Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 51.
52  E.A.D., ‘Kuwait’s Opposition: A Reawakening’, The Economist, 17 April 2014. Available at http://
www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/04/kuwaits-opposition.
53  Joe Stork, quoted in ‘Kuwait: 5 Critics Stripped of Citizenship’, Human Rights Watch, 10 August 
2014. Available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/10/kuwait-5-critics-stripped-citizenship. 
54  Former Salafi MP Abdullah al-Bargash, two of his brothers and his sister were arrested, along with 
Ahmad Jabir al-Shammari, owner of al-Yawm satellite television and Al-ʿAlam al-Yawm newspaper, 
which are said to have ties with the liberal Popular Bloc.
55  A. Saleh, ‘ICM accuses government of ‘using’ citizenship file’, Kuwait Times, 2 August 2014. Avail-
able at http://news.kuwaittimes.net/icm-accuses-government-using-citizenship-file/.
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parliamentary television channel, about Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Moham-
med bin Zayed al-Nahyan being ‘against Sunni Islam’.56 Though al-Duwailah was not 
charged in Kuwait, his case was referred to the UAE’s Federal Supreme Court, which 
will try him in absentia.57 
In the face of limited government suppression, the ICM is likely to continue to priv-
ilege political reform over social policies, as opposition groups focus increasingly on 
pursuing common goals of political reform.58 In fact, al-Duwailah explicitly called on 
political blocs to overcome their traditional differences in a January statement shortly 
after his arrest, and such opposition unification appears to be taking place.59 The 
ICM, along with al-Barrak’s Popular Labour Movement and the Salafi al-Umma Party 
have led the charge in continued protests in 2015 against judicial corruption and the 
government’s policy of stripping citizenship,60 while calling for new parliamentary 
elections and the release of political prisoners.61 Al-Barrak’s sentencing to two years in 
prison in February 2015 spurred a renewed call to protests.62 The most recent oppo-
sition rally, held in March in response to al-Barrak’s arrest, was broken up by security 
forces and resulted in the jailing of dozens of opposition leaders and alleged assault 
of participants.63 The more the government excludes opposition political blocs from 
power, the more likely they are to privilege a pro-democracy agenda over ideological 
differences. In this way, government crackdown has encouraged the moderation of 
traditional Islamist social aims as the Brotherhood and some Salafi strands promote 
broad-ranging reform, rather than Islamisation.
By tempering its demands for laws to Islamise society and for the implementation 
of shariʿa, the ICM has come to hold a more powerful political position as a lead-
ing opposition bloc. Its political capital, though, is not expressed solely through its 
representation in parliament, as its social organisation (Islah) forms a major part of 
56  ‘UAE to Try Kuwaiti Ex-MP over Remarks on Abu Dhabi Crown Prince’, Middle East Eye, 9 March 
2015. Available at http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-try-kuwaiti-ex-mp-over-remarks-abu-dha-
bi-crown-prince-1546132555.
57  Ibid.
58  Hamid, Temptations of Power, pp. 54-55.
59  ‘Al-Duwailah: ‘Ala al-Quwwa al-Siyasiyya an Tafham Hassasiyyat al-Marhala Tatatalab al-Taʿali ʿan 
al-Khilafat al-Taqlidiyya’ (Al-Duwailah: The Political Forces Must Understand that the Sensitivity of 
the Stage Requires the Transcendence of Traditional Differences), Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Dusturi-
yya, 11 January 2015. Available at http://tinyurl.com/nnbqezm.
60  Dahlia Kholaif, ‘Kuwait’s Opposition Movements Feel the Squeeze on Freedoms’, Middle East 
Eye, 30 March 2015. Available at http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/kuwaits-opposition-move-
ments-feel-squeeze-freedoms-1703345061.
61  ‘Kuwait: Opposition Protest Broken Up’, Human Rights Watch, 29 March 2015. Available at http://
www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/29/kuwait-opposition-protest-broken.
62  ‘Kuwait Sentences Opposition Politician Mussallam Al Barrak to Two Years in Jail for ‘Insulting 
Ruler’’, Global Voices, 22 February 2015. Available at http://globalvoicesonline.org/2015/02/22/kuwait-
sentences-opposition-politician-mussallam-al-barrak-to-two-years-in-jail-for-insulting-ruler/.
63  Linah Alsaafin, ‘Kuwait Security Forces Violently Disperse Anti-Government Protest’, Middle East 
Eye, 23 March 2015. Available at http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/kuwaiti-security-forces-violent-
ly-disperse-anti-government-protest-1878869579.
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outreach to the general Kuwaiti population and has become particularly influential as 
the ICM has boycotted the last two parliamentary elections.
The popular perception in Kuwait remains that ‘you can speak reason with the Ikhwan. 
They’re part of the system of elites, so they would never dream of overturning [the sys-
tem]’.64 Ismail al-Shatti, for his part, has called for the implementation of all parts of 
shariʿa over time, considering that ‘[t]he Qurʾan came in stages’.65 This more moderate 
stance prevails today, as issues of government reform appear more urgent.
While the Kuwaiti government has never legally recognised the ICM,66 its approach in 
dealing with the bloc, and with the Brotherhood in general, is far more moderate than 
the repressive security-led approach seen in the UAE in part because the group’s status 
as a primarily local political bloc has been established and accepted.  
Unlike other Brotherhood affiliates in the Gulf, the Kuwaiti branch has also benefit-
ted from years of experience in government.67 Perhaps because of its involvement in 
public office, the Kuwaiti Brotherhood has learned to balance its conservative social 
goals with its pro-democracy agenda into a politically influential platform. 
Qatar 
Unlike its neighbours, the Qatari government has taken steps towards the soft co-opta-
tion of the Muslim Brotherhood, considering the organisation a potential ally rather 
than major threat. Ira William Zartman, taking the cases of Egypt, Morocco, and Tuni-
sia, points out that opposition movements can in fact amplify support of the state. 
‘Neither uses the other, but each serves the other’s interests in performing its own 
role. Thus, stability in the contemporary Arab state can be explained not only by the 
government’s handling of opposition but also by the opposition’s handling of itself 
and the government’.68 This symbiotic relationship may best describe the ties between 
the Qatari government and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Qatari government has 
historically granted a public voice to Islamists, in addition to conceding to a number 
of Islamist-supported social policies, and the Brotherhood has in turn praised the 
government for its Islamist-aligned policies, thereby cementing al-Thani power and 
domestic political stability – a testament to the system’s strength. Simply put, the 
Qatari regime does not place restrictions on the Muslim Brotherhood because it does 
not need to do so.
64  Interview with Ibrahim al-Hadban, 14 November 2013.
65  Shafeeq Ghabra, ‘Balancing State and Society: The Islamic Movement in Kuwait’, Middle East Policy 
5/2 (1997), p. 69.
66  Nathan J. Brown, ‘Pushing Toward Party Politics?: Kuwait’s Islamic Constitutional Movement’, 
Carnegie Papers 79, (January 2007), p. 15. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp79_
brown_kuwait_final.pdf.
67  Interview with Sami al-Faraj, 13 November 2013.
68  Ira William Zartman, ‘Opposition as Support of the State’, in Adeed I. Dawisha and Ira William 
Zartman (eds.), Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State (London: Croom Helm, 1988), p. 62.
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As one former advisor to the Amiri Diwan put it, ‘why should the government put 
pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood when they don’t challenge them? The two are 
interdependent’.69 In its current form, the Qatari Brotherhood exists as ‘a tendency’ or 
‘a current’, conceived of as an ideology or set of beliefs, rather than a political bloc.70 In 
such a loosely organised form, members are able to meet without fearing consequences 
of a crackdown from authorities. Furthermore, their goals of daʿwa and Islamic educa-
tion are achievable without the implementation of a structure that the state may find 
objectionable. By remaining amorphous, the Brotherhood can continue to enjoy state 
backing while maintaining its independent activities.
Muslim Brotherhood influence in Qatar’s religious and education sectors is palpable, 
yet like much else in the country, uninstitutionalised and largely informal. ‘There is 
influence of Muslim Brotherhood in justice, education awqaf – not in terms of policies 
– but in terms of influencing people who do make policy; this influence is not institu-
tionalised’.71 As a result, studying the Brotherhood as a movement in Qatar is difficult, 
especially because its ideology shares many common points with conservative Islam 
commonly found in the Gulf and highly influential inside the country. As explained 
by one Qatari, ‘it’s not that these ties don’t exist but that they are more benign than 
people realise’.72 
Islamist sentiment has, how-
ever, affected social policies 
inside Qatar. Determining 
whether this feeling reflects 
backing of the Muslim Broth-
erhood or of conservative 
Wahhabi Islam is difficult. 
Since 2011, for example, 
the government has banned the sale of alcohol from the Pearl-Qatar development, 
has removed statues considered religiously offensive from public spaces, has placed 
further restrictions on when alcohol can be consumed in hotels, and has backed and 
funded increasingly public campaigns for moderate dress. Such campaigns would be 
the purview of Brotherhood organisations elsewhere in the Middle East yet in Qatar 
appear to have formed almost spontaneously.
The ad hoc and informal nature of the organisation inside Qatar suits the state’s polit-
ical character as the least institutionalised and most personalistic of the three systems 
under consideration.
69  Interview with Ibrahim Arafat, 4 December 2014.
70  Al-Nafisi.
71  Interview with Hassan al-Ibrahim.
72  Interview with Michael Stephens.
‘Why should the government put pressure 
on the Muslim Brotherhood when they 
don’t challenge them? The two are  
interdependent.’ - Ibrahim Arafat
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The United Arab Emirates
In contrast to its Kuwaiti and Qatari counterparts, the Emirati government considers 
the Muslim Brotherhood to be an existential threat, as an organisation promoting a for-
eign ideology. As such, its response has been security-focused, yet has differed slightly 
among emirates. Abu Dhabi has taken the strongest stance, reflecting the belief of that 
emirate’s Crown Prince Sheikh Muhammad bin Zayed that ‘if there were an election [in 
the UAE] tomorrow, the Muslim Brotherhood would take over’.73 Abu Dhabi has always 
been cautious about the Muslim Brotherhood, having denied the organisation permis-
sion to operate in the emirate as early as the 1990s. The government has responded 
with efforts to promote what it considered to be the appropriate brand of ‘moderate’ 
Islam. In fact, restrictions exist about the length of beard that members of the armed 
forces can grow, for fear that they may be mistaken for conservative Muslims who tra-
ditionally favour long beards.74 Aware of the Brotherhood’s eagerness to participate 
in political debate, that emirate’s government also promoted the emergence of other, 
more politically quietist. Further cementing the Emirati government’s stance against 
the Brotherhood, a new anti-terrorism law passed in August 2014 updated the 2004 
legislation, allowing for expanded use of the death penalty and other severe punish-
ments.75 The legislation, though cracking down on violent extremist groups at a time 
of regional fear about an resurgence of violent jihadist activity, also ‘has the potential 
to be used against peaceful activists and government critics due to the broad ambit of 
its provisions, their vague definition, and the range of actions that may be considered 
under the law to amount to terrorism’.76 As Sarah Leah Whitson of Human Rights 
Watch put it, ‘[i]n the UAE it’s now a case of ‘you’re with us or you’re a terrorist’’.77 In 
November 2014, the UAE released a list of 82 organisations that it considers terrorist 
groups. Although this record includes violent groups such as al-Qaʿida and IS, it also 
comprises nonviolent groups like Islah and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, in addi-
tion to advocacy organisations like the Council on American-Islamic Relations.78
Dubai’s government, on the other hand, has traditionally focused primarily on ‘‘track-
ing’ individuals known to be sympathetic to the Islamist agenda’.79 In an effort to 
dissuade Dubai citizens from Islamism, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, 
73  Mohammed bin Zayed, quoted in Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse 
of the Gulf Monarchies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 14.
74  ‘UAE Minimizing Influence of Islamic Extremists’, Embassy of the United States Abu Dhabi, 
WikiLeaks, 10 November 2004. Available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ABUD-
HABI4061_a.html.
75  ‘‘There Is No Freedom Here’: Silencing Dissent in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)’, Amnesty 
International, November 2014, p. 10. Available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/there-
is-no-freedom-here-silencing-dissent-in-the-united-arab-emirates 
76  Ibid.
77  ‘UAE: Terrorism Law Threatens Lives, Liberty’, Human Rights Watch, 4 December 2014. Available 
at http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/03/uae-terrorism-law-threatens-lives-liberty.
78  ‘UAE Blacklists 82 Groups as ‘Terrorist’’, Al Arabiya, 15 November 2014. Available at http://english.
alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/11/15/UAE-formally-blacklists-82-groups-as-terrorist-.html.
79  ‘UAE Minimizing Influence of Islamic Extremists’.
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until the recent crackdown, met with them ‘to explain to them the error of their ways, 
and to tell them that if they are looking for a job, or land, or any other assistance, they 
should not hesitate to ask’. Apparently, this approach (direct appeal from the ruler) 
is often effective, especially for younger devotees. Those who are resistant to change, 
however, are locked up, sometimes repeatedly, for months at a time in hopes that this 
will dissuade them from acting on their Islamist tendencies.80 In contrast, rulers in 
Ras al-Khaimah have traditionally allowed more freedom to the Brotherhood, yet a 
member of that ruling family was jailed in the recent crackdown.
It remains to be seen whether a large-scale Abu Dhabi-led crackdown on the Emirati 
Ikhwan was necessary due to the group’s widespread appeal. In the words of Abdulkha-
leq Abdulla, ‘one-third of the population probably thinks this way, that the state could 
be more Islamic’, but not necessarly Muslim Brotherhood.81 The Emirati government 
has understood the influence of Brotherhood organisations to be primarily political 
and thus threatening to their ruling system. In the face of such ideological competi-
tion, they hope to promote secular nationalism and institutionalised Islam that will 
harbour loyalty to the regime.
April 2012 marked the beginning of arrests targeting the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
the government considered to be the primary political threat. In the words of liberal 
activist Ahmed Mansoor, the Ikhwan ‘was more popular and well-known [than the 
liberal movement] due to its social activities. Many of its members were seen as the 
cream of society […] with good repu-
tations and important positions’.82 In 
April 2012, seven Islah members (the 
so-called UAE7),83 who were signato-
ries to the March 2011 petition and 
whose citizenship had been stripped 
in December 2011, were jailed after they did not leave the country as the government 
requested.84 They contended that they had been ‘unjustly targeted for their political 
views’ since they had signed the petition on behalf of Islah.85 These arrests marked 
only the beginning of the crackdown on Islah. By the end of 2012, 94 alleged members 
of Islah had been imprisoned. 
The Emirati government has been surprisingly outspoken in its recent criticism of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, dismissing the organisation’s calls for reform as attempts to dis-
mantle the regime. Although the government’s actions against the Ikhwan only made 
headlines during the Arab Spring, members of the government had expressed concerns 
80  Ibid.
81  Interview with Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, 10 February 2014.
82  Interview with Ahmed Mansoor, 26 March 2014. 
83  The seven included Sheikh Mohammad Abdul Razzaq al-Siddiq, Ahmed Ghaith al-Suwaidi, 
Ali Hussain al-Hammadi, Shaheen Abdullah al-Hosani, Hussain Munif Abdullah al-Jabri, Hassan 
al-Jabri, and Ibrahim Hassan al-Marzouqi.
84  ‘‘There Is No Freedom Here’: Silencing Dissent in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)’, p. 7.
85  Davidson, After the Sheikhs, p. 225.
‘In the UAE it’s now a case of 
‘you’re with us or you’re a terrorist’’ 
- Sarah Leah Whitson
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about the organisation in conversations with American officials as early as 2007. 
At that time, they used ‘‘quiet marginalization’ and support for reintegrating MB 
[Muslim Brotherhood] members back into mainstream society. Members of the ruling 
families often got personally involved in this process’.86 The UAE ruling families 
long feared Brotherhood influence, despite their massive wealth, demonstrating the 
salience of ideological politics in a super-rentier. Having failed to ‘buy off’ such move-
ments, the government resolved to squash it.
During the January 2012 GCC National and Regional Security Conference sponsored 
by the Bahrain Centre for Strategic, International and Energy Studies, Dhahi Khalfan 
went so far as to state: ‘The Muslim Brotherhood is a security threat to the Gulf, and 
is no less dangerous than Iran’.87 Emirati Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed 
al-Nahyan similarly denounced the Brotherhood as ‘an organization which encroaches 
upon the sovereignty and integrity of nations’ and called on Gulf governments to work 
against its expanding influence.88 Such language illustrates government attempts to 
use fears about emerging Islamist political parties in the region as an excuse to dismiss 
such groups’ demands for political reform within the UAE.
Conclusions
As expatriate populations increase, Islamist groups like the Brotherhood will retain a 
powerful voice against increasing Westernisation. Super-rentier governments endeav-
our to balance their desires to modernise and to accommodate their overwhelming 
non-national populations with the need to address grievances of national populations 
that remain, for the most part, conservative and religious.
Due to strict laws concerning civil society in Qatar and the UAE, Muslim Brotherhood 
affiliates there are relegated to the social realm, and non-Islamist political blocs often 
have little space in which to operate. Kuwait affords the Brotherhood an institution-
alised place in political life, however. These different forms highlight the fact that 
Islamists adapt their activities to operate within the restrictive system; their ideology 
cannot be ‘bought off’ simply through government disbursements. By creating ideo-
logical links at the grassroots, they amass long-term popular support.89
The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE began with the goal of Isla-
mising society in the face of Western encroachment. Since their establishment, these 
86  Ingo Forstenlechner, Emilie Rutledge, and Rashed Salem al-Nuaimi, ‘The UAE, the ‘Arab Spring’ 
and Different Types of Dissent’, Middle East Policy 19/4 (2012), p. 55.
87  Abdullah al-Rashid, ‘The Brothers and the Emirates’, The Majalla, 14 February 2013. Available at 
http://www.majalla.com/eng/2013/02/article55238281. 
88  Ian Black, ‘Emirati Nerves Rattled by Islamists’ Rise’, The Guardian, 12 October 2012. Available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/on-the-middle-east/2012/oct/12/uae-muslimbrotherhood-egypt-ar-
abspring.
89  Larry Diamond, ‘Why Are There No Arab Democracies?’ Journal of Democracy 21/1 (2010), pp. 
100-01.
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groups have altered their priorities to varying degrees. The Kuwaiti Brotherhood 
has come to privilege electoral success and political influence more broadly through 
wide-ranging reform over the initial social agenda that it pushed in the 1980s. The 
Qatari Brotherhood, on the other hand, has favoured the ideological and social ele-
ments of its platform over structural or institutionalised influence. Even what appears 
to be social power, as in the Qatari case, is hardly politically neutral, particularly in a 
super-rentier that allows few outlets for political debate. Finally, the Emirati Brother-
hood, before the most recent crackdown began in 2012, operated in a space between 
the purely political (inhabited by the Kuwaiti Brotherhood) and the amorphous (rep-
resented by the Qatari Ikhwan). While it advocated for social reforms, the Emirati 
Brotherhood came to voice concerns about political freedoms more broadly, thereby 
leading to restrictions from the regime. The government thus made it unlikely for 
the Emirati Brotherhood to evolve to the state of its Kuwaiti counterpart, which has 
developed a clearly defined political platform and popularity. Despite the different 
trajectories they eventually took, each of the Gulf Brotherhood movements began with 
the platform of countering Western encroachment into their societies.
The presence of oil rents thus does not mitigate Islamist complaint, nor does it make 
such voices politically irrelevant. Emirati rulers were particularly attuned to the polit-
ical capital held by their domestic Brotherhood movements and even considered the 
Ikhwan an existential threat. Kuwait and Qatar, on the other hand, have granted the 
Ikhwan more freedom, reflecting those leaders’ beliefs that co-optation and contain-
ment are more effective than crackdown.
Rulers in the Gulf seem to be coming to terms with the fact that Islamist complaint 
will always form a part of political discourse in that region. Signalling modification of 
its previous hardline stance, Saudi Arabia hosted the International Union for Muslim 
Scholars, headed by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi and dubbed a terrorist organisation by 
the UAE, for the Islamic Conference convened in February 2015 by King Salman.90 Ear-
lier that month, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud bin Faysal stated that his government has 
‘no problem with the Muslim Brotherhood’.91 While Qatar’s support of Brotherhood 
regimes in Egypt and Tunisia has been heavily criticised, its moderate approach towards 
the Ikhwan inside its borders may be inspiring a change in the Saudi stance. With the 
Brotherhood unlikely to disappear from the political or social scene, as it can maintain 
its position in the social sphere, a strategy of co-optation or cooperation is more sustain-
able than one of crackdown. Even in cases, as in the UAE, where the government has 
urged the closing of the Brotherhood affiliate, it has been pushed farther underground 
and has become increasingly informal, rather than having become radicalised. 
90  ‘Saudi King Hosts Muslim Scholars Close to Brotherhood’, Middle East Monitor, 24 February 2015. 
Available at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/17159-saudi-king-hosts-muslim-
scholars-close-to-brotherhood.
91  Saud bin Faysal, quoted in Mary Atkins, ‘Saudi Arabia Has ‘No Problem’ with Muslim Brother-
hood: Foreign Minister’, Middle East Eye, 11 February 2015. Available at http://www.middleeasteye.
net/news/saudi-foreign-minister-no-problem-muslim-brotherhood-230201904.
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Perhaps due to the union of unequal emirates in the UAE, the state has been more 
concerned about the emergence of ideological politics. States that seem similar from 
the outside, then, have very different considerations when formulating policy towards 
the Muslim Brotherhood.
Because they gain appeal primarily through an ideology unaffected by the presence of 
wealth, Islamist organisations, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, will not become 
any less influential in the Gulf in the coming years, despite campaigns against them. 
Rather, they will take on different forms, depending on the political freedom afforded 
them. Further, because Ikhwan groups in the super-rentiers do not need to provide 
goods and services, as they do in poorer states like Egypt and Jordan, they have been 
allowed more freedom in terms of structural appearance. 
Rentier Islamists will continue to hold sway primarily through the informal sector. The 
means through which such Islamists gain support is not threatened by changes to the 
Ikhwan’s strength elsewhere in the Middle East due to the power of their ideological 
message. As long as the state continues to politicise Islam, which seems likely as a legit-
imation strategy, political Islam will remain relevant.
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